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NIETZSCHE AND CHRISTIANITY 
 
Introduction 
 Nietzsche levelled the accusation against Christianity that, 
following Plato, it strengthened man’s conviction of the existence of two 
worlds: the wretched and the perfect, the earthly and the heavenly, the 
temporal and the eternal, in contradiction with the truth that each time 
it is my life which is an eternity1. As a result, man orients himself 
towards an abstract eternity, which is not the eternity of his life, 
forgetting about the latter. What is more, under the influence of the 
Protestant tradition in which God is more the harsh, just Old Testament 
judge rather than a God full of mercy, Nietzsche perceived Christianity in 
a distorted manner as a religion of guilt and punishment, judgement and 
accusation. Meanwhile, such a perspective runs contrary to the teachings 
of Jesus himself (see Luke 6, 37).  
 The leading theme of this article is not, however, the criticism of 
Christianity as a religion undertaken by Nietzsche. In analysing the 
relationship between the German philosopher and Christianity, I would 
like to focus on indicating Nietzsche’s numerous links with the Christian 
tradition, and to briefly discuss the influence of the Protestant tradition 
on the very generalized view of Christianity we may observe from 
Nietzsche. Thus I do not want to concern myself with how Nietzsche 
assessed Christianity and what he thought of it, but rather: did he 
reason aptly, did he grasp it correctly. The task I have set for myself is a 
particular one, namely, it is to pin down which ideas of importance to 
Christianity appear in Nietzsche’s work. It is not my ambition to 
determine whether he adopted them consciously, or whether it is only a 
coincidence; likely both answers are correct, that is Nietzsche drew 
inspiration from Christianity, if only to clearly separate himself from it in 
                                                 
1  Cf. [Filek 2014, 158]. 
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some places, but it is not always a deliberate inspiration. What is more, I 
feel that we may risk the theory that Nietzsche poorly knew the Roman 
Catholic version of Christianity; he even read the Bible in its Lutheran 
translation, and perhaps if he had familiarized himself with Catholicism, 
his judgement of the Christian religion would have been entirely 
different. This, however, we can never know. Piotr Graczyk proposes a 
theological type of dialectic of Christianity, derived from an interpretation 
of the sense of the Easter Triduum. The author emphasizes 
distinguishing Good Friday Christianity, concentrated on suffering and 
empathy for the sufferer, from Holy Saturday Christianity, when Jesus 
descends into hell, and the absence of God is keenly felt on Earth, finally 
pointing to its “Sunday” strain, which affirms the world that recovers 
holiness and harmony, without renouncing contradiction and pain. The 
first, Friday Christianity is identified by Graczyk with the religiousness of 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Simone Weil; the second, gloomy, he associates 
with Protestantism. Finally, an affirmative Christianity, harmonically 
joining sadness and joy may be identified with Catholicism [Graczyk 
2006, 38-52].  
 It is a fact that Nietzsche fights with Christianity, which does not 
prevent him from internalizing some Christian themes in spite of having 
a very superficial and incomplete picture of it. Meanwhile, as 
Protestantism balks before guilt, the body and time, Catholicism affirms 
them within certain limits. Nietzsche is disgusted by bourgeois morality 
joined with the facade religiosity, with an attitude whose core is a 
scrupulous and earnest, but mindless and ostentatious adherence to 
norms, contradicting the essence of Christianity. However, I would not 
like to create the impression that I am trying to persistently reconcile 
Nietzsche with Christianity, which is why I also mention the 
unquestionable differences in both doctrines such as the relationship to 
the issues of truth, compassion, transcendence, mercy and eternity. 
There are, however, a large number of common elements: praise for 
authenticity, creativity and freedom (“I love him who is of a free spirit 
and a free heart” declares Zarathustra), the ethics of dignity, the postulate 
of self-formation, appreciation of suffering, rejection of revenge and 
everything that is small and false, and finally, discipline of the will 
craving repetition as a confirmation of self, faithfulness to self.2 
                                                 
2 The last of these make a proper identity, understood as constituting the unity of 
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Two roots of European culture  
 It is commonly known how important the tradition of antiquity 
was to Nietzsche. Nietzsche is one of the most European philosophers in 
the sense that he is a son of European culture; he was formed not only 
by knowledge of Greek philosophy, history and art, the entirety of 
European art (particularly music), travel around Europe, but also to a 
significant degree by the Christian heritage. 
 
  Greeks discovered reason and its potency in discovering the 
world and man. One attribute of Greek philosophy is naturalism, a focus 
on the laws of nature. In contrast to it, supranaturalist philosophy, 
concerns spirituality.3 Our culture thus has two roots: Greek and Semitic.4 
The Greek tradition based its knowledge on getting to know the world, 
while in the second, supernaturalist tradition, knowledge was a 
                                                                                                                            
the personality, possible. 
3 It should be emphasized that, in the end, Christian philosophy (both patristics 
and scholastics) based itself on the Greek tradition, it did not disassociate itself from 
classic ancient philosophy; even if it was initially held to be unneeded, and even 
worthless, it soon began to accept it and creatively expand on it.  
4 A similar line of thought can be found in the works of Leo Strauss, who draws 
attention to the juxtaposition of the traditions of Athens and Jerusalem, the two pillars 
of Western civilizations. These are two antagonistic paradigms of wisdom, two different 
conceptions of rationality, two juxtaposed codes that cannot be reconciled: reason and 
faith, knowledge and revelation, seeking fundamental, universal rules by way of rational 
inquiry and acknowledging the primacy of transcendence understood as a secret, 
critical of incumbent truths vs. submission to authority. These two mutually-exclusive 
traditions also lead to two separate ethos of life; in the first, the primacy of thought is 
assumed, while in the second it is of action. Supporters of the cultural code inherited 
from Athens devote themselves to exploring the world and its truths, placing their hope 
in the potential of inborn reason, while the descendants of the Jerusalem tradition opt 
for faith and trust in the truth of religious revelation, humbly acknowledging its 
inaccessibility for human mind. Fundamentally, the aim of Strauss is to draw attention 
to the fact that the values of the Western world are often derived in part from the 
biblical tradition, in part from the Greek one. The tension between these two heritages 
is, however, invigorating and conducive to development. Thus there is nothing strange 
in the fact that the Nietzschean overman brings together the best of Jerusalem and 
Athens. In Strauss’s opinion (and Nietzsche’s himself), all religion, including 
Christianity, is the opposite of philosophy. Strauss perceived Nietzsche as the only 
philosopher capable of defeating Platonism. See Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and 
Jewish Thinker, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham, Maryland 1994. 
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consequence of faith, love for good was a condition of good, in 
accordance with this interpretation a good man is one who wants good, 
selects good, strives for good, overcomes himself. Nietzsche dislikes 
Greek ethic intellectualism. It is too trivial, it interjects man and his 
dilemmas into a simple and artificial schematism. What is more, in 
Semitic culture, particularly in the Roman Catholicism that grew out of 
it, the primary sense is that of hearing, while in the Greek culture it is 
sight. Zarathustra calls out repeatedly "He that has ears to hear let him 
hear!" [Nietzsche 1967, 294]. This is a clear reference to the Gospel of St. 
Matthew (Matthew 13:9). 
 European culture links faith with knowledge, Christianity 
compliments Greek culture with feeling. It does not run away from 
emotion and suffering as Greeks do. The first Christians, capable to love 
suffering, even clinging to it, were strange, alien and incomprehensible 
to the Romans. The Gospel of St. Matthew contains eight beatitudes, of 
which one of the first says "Blessed are those who mourn, for they will 
be comforted." (Matthew 5, 3-10). The ethical ideal of the ancient Greeks 
was the wise man who led a reasoned life in accordance with nature. 
Freedom was apprehended as the understanding of necessity, power 
over oneself, distance, keeping control of one’s emotions. The stoics 
formulated the norms of resignation, dispassion, apatheia.  
 And Zarathustra? He loves his students, he is not ashamed of 
tears; in the parable "Pilgrim", he cries bitterly from anger and longing 
for his deserted friends. Not the first nor the last time. In the final 
parable we discover about Zarathustra that "But his heart, was loosed, 
and tears dropped from his eyes and fell on his hands" [Nietzsche 1967, 
438]. Do we find any picture of a crying Socrates? Zarathustra dares to 
call the Aristotelian golden mean a mediocrity [Nietzsche 1967, 282]. He 
declares that guilt and pain should be sought out. Zarathustra is 
accurately characterized as "the advocate of life, the advocate of 
suffering, the advocate of the circle!” [Nietzsche 1967, 328]. Finally – he 
does not hesitate at one of the climaxes to shout "The world is deep, 
Deeper than the day had been aware. Deep is its woe. (...) Woe implores: 
Go!” [Nietzsche 1967, 339]. 
Does Christ not encourage us to learn to love suffering, to accept it and 
to transform it into something greater? In Christianity, suffering is not a 
goal in and of itself, but something of significance, which can possess 
deep sense. 
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Say "yes" to suffering 
 Of course, the matter is more complicated. In the parable "The 
Drunken Song", Zarathustra proclaims one important sentence: "joy is 
deeper still than grief can be" [Nietzsche 1954, 362]. An intriguing 
question arises: why is joy deeper than grief? Christianity emphasizes 
grief, thus deprecating pleasure. Defying this tradition of thinking about 
pain and joy as opposites, Nietzsche draws attention to the fact that they 
cannot be separated from each other, they are connected, without one 
and the other there would be no life. The nucleus of life appears through 
joy, life comes about in joy, and is then born in pain, which is present 
from the very moment of birth. As Józef Tischner wrote: „Giving birth is 
first of all an event of human life. It is connected to the experience of 
pain and at once to the experience of happiness” [Tischner 2005, 67]. 
Zarathustra repeatedly refers us to the postulate of giving birth to 
ourselves, and this must take place in pain, which is why the analogy 
with birth pains is unusually clear. Pain, however, is not a value per se, 
and giving birth to oneself is a long process. 
 According to Nietzsche he who concentrates on suffering desires 
to fade away. Essentially, people experiencing suffering wish to fade 
away, but they are inconsistent, as the choice may offer either a fading 
away of everything, or consent to the eternal restoration of everything; 
in the spirit of Nietzsche, one may not be selective in respect of life. He 
who focuses on joy says to the world, to life, to time "Last forever, return 
forever, be yourself forever”. Meanwhile, everything that suffers does not 
want itself, renounces itself, and instead yearns to leave its descendants5. 
Joy, however, does not desire any descendants – it wants itself, it wants 
eternity, it is will in the form of a spring that triggers itself: “But joys all 
want – eternity! Want deep profound eternity!” [Nietzsche 1954, 365]. 
Pain, however, is breaking free to pass away, that is its nature, but if we 
agree to passing away then everything must pass away; if we negate 
pain, then we must negate everything. Joy is the other way around – it 
                                                 
5  It is again turning attention to the similarity of the theme of descendants 
mentioned in this parable and a fragment of the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans titled 
“Christians are Adopted Children of God”: "For all who are being led by the Spirit of God, 
these are sons of God … and if children, heirs also, heirs of God” (Romans 8, 14:17). See 
also A. Szklarska, Report from the ethno-anthropological seminar of 06.11.2013 
(unpublished). 
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does not long to fade away; just the opposite, joy is something greater, all 
joy desires eternity. If we say “yes” to eternity, then in consequence we 
say “yes” to everything, which means that we also say "yes" to pain, 
because with Nietzsche all things are intermingles. North is south, pain 
is joy, night is sun, the wise man is a fool.6 The consolidation of 
opposites, saying "yes" to life, is grounded in accepting all aspects of life. 
The question may be asked whether higher men are called ‘failures’ by 
Zarathustra because they are unable to say "yes" to pain? For Nietzsche, 
who, after all, choses joy, suffering as a part of life, of a greater whole, is 
possessed of an unquestionable sense. If we affirm everything, that 
includes suffering. A consequence of accepting the idea of eternal return 
is the observation that there is no way to cut oneself off from suffering, 
failure, despair. If we say “yes” to the here and now, we must accept that 
everything is linked by a chain of necessity, and we must therefore also 
say “yes” to pain. This does not change the fact that, according to 
Nietzsche, man’s task is to rejoice in life. 
 
Two conceptions of time, two eternities 
 Here I would like to make reference to the paradigm of eternity 
proposed by Nietzsche in the parable “Vita Femina” (known also as “The 
Second Dance Song”). Zarathustra conducts a romantic dialogue with life. 
Life is Zarathustra’s bride. In the next parable, “The Seven Seals”, life is 
identified as eternity. “For I love thee, O Eternity!” [Nietzsche 1954, 257] 
says Zarathustra repeatedly. But it must be clearly emphasized that what 
is understood in Christian culture to be eternal life has nothing in 
common with the life of Zarathustra, who addresses the eternity: “You”. 
It is not a matter of the eternity of underworlds, whose teachers were 
derided by Zarathustra. It is my life that is eternity. Thus, it is a matter of 
the eternity of this life, not eternity per se. “Thus Spake Zarathustra” is 
one long love song dedicated to this world. Zarathustra does not desire in 
the least to reach the heavenly kingdom, which, as Christ himself 
preached, is within the grasp of those who are like children, but as a 
gallant man, he desires “the earthly kingdom” [Nietzsche 1954, 355]. At 
the same time, he decides to accept that nothing passes irreversibly, that 
everything continues and eternally returns, every decision, choice, 
action or neglect remains with us forever, and in this sense 
                                                 
6 See: [Szklarska 2014, 175-176]. 
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irretrievability is a mirage. Thus, we may not consider the things we are 
unable to take pride in and which are hurtful to remember as merely the 
distant past. 
 
The postulate of self-formation 
 Christianity, in spite of the capacity to wash away sins, also 
emphasizes responsibility for one’s choices and their consequences, the 
importance of leading one’s life consciously, self-formation, shaping 
oneself. In Christianity, man, who is fragile in nature, may be a hero of 
the spirit, conquering his own weakness, overcoming himself. The 
Nietzschean spirit of heaviness refers to something that happens in the 
lives of each of us, the existential discouragement, the letting go. The 
opposite of this state is the valour of being, the courage to struggle with 
adversaries, with temptations, with sloth, with laziness. In both 
philosophies we may essentially encounter the same fundamental 
postulate: self-improvement, continually striving to become better. John 
Paul II orders us to demand more of ourselves that others demand of us.  
 
 Many of Nietzsche’s primary assumptions seem to be in conflict 
with Christianity, yet at the same time they arise out of it. In Nietzsche’s 
opinion, everything that exists desires to retain its existence. The essence 
of reality is the will to live. Reason is in service to the urge to live, the 
irrational element. The aim of life is life itself, it has no objective sense. In 
Christianity, there is such a sense and it is tightly linked with 
transcendence. In Schopenhauer’s conception, which heavily influenced 
Nietzsche, man experiences a continual absence, deficiency, his life is 
filled with suffering that results from the collision of urges. The essence 
of reality is will, but the will to power, that is not existence itself, but a 
strong, authentic existence. The will to power evolves, taking on an ever 
more perfect form. Nietzsche, similarly to Schopenhauer, remains under 
the influence of the conviction that the world is awash in tears and blood, 
and from this conclusion he determines that it is beautiful.7 Power is 
spiritual power, it is the capacity to live as it wishes, the rejection of 
subservience to all external norms, it is the absence of fear in the face of 
fate. In Christianity, man’s task is, in a sense, to subjugate himself to 
commandments, but it is not true that this should come from fear of the 
                                                 
7 See [Schopenhauer 2007, 5-18]. 
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fires of hell and because of the law itself. Man is to live decently and 
nobly for his own good and out of love for God. He does this to retain his 
dignity and majesty, held so dear by Nietzsche. This allows man to look in 
the mirror and into the eyes of others without fear. All limitations that a 
Christian places on himself are voluntary, and are to help him live with 
dignity and without fear. He is aware that in life he can lose something 
greater than life itself, and if he fears anything, it is precisely this. He is 
not afraid of fate or of rejection by his surroundings, but rather of the 
loss of himself, his dignity and his greatness as a person capable of 
choosing, not guided by conformism and benefit but rather by love of 
God and of his fellow man. 
 In Nietzsche’s opinion, man’s nature should be expressed in 
instinctive, passionate, non-conformist, courageous action, in conduct 
not designed to please others and without regard for their acceptance. 
Both Nietzsche and Christianity are disgusted by Pharisaic hypocrisy, by 
living in falsehood, by the veneer of existence. 
 
Pity, love, hate 
 There is, however, one point that fundamentally distinguishes the 
two programmes from each other. Nietzsche was contemptuous of 
ethics, which viewed pity as a virtue. He felt that this was a humiliating 
attitude, and that pity is what keeps alive that which was headed towards 
death. On the other hand, the last paragraph of point 18 in the parable 
"Old and New Tables" points to a particular concern for a deteriorating, 
dying man. Zarathustra orders to keep dogs and insects away from the 
sick man, this attitude is in contrast to finishing off the weak. And yet 
Nietzsche attacked Christianity for its glorification of pity and for 
suppressing natural urges. He held life itself to be the highest goal. 
Christianity does indeed place great weight on mercy towards fellow 
men, and on empathy, understood as the pain of another in my own 
heart. Meanwhile, the character of pity is something different, it assumes 
comparing oneself to others, I help another out of pity because I feel I 
am better than he is, often humiliating him in the process. This is in no 
way the attitude promoted by Christianity. Zarathustra is aware that he 
who helps or who gives of himself must display delicateness and tact in 
order to avoid humiliating the beneficiary: "how much harder it is to give 
properly than to take properly, and that bestowing well is an art—the 
last, subtlest master-art of kindness," he declares [Nietzsche 1954, 301]. 
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 It is a fact that Nietzsche associated the crisis of 19th-century 
culture with bourgeoisie conformity, with a limitation of the natural, 
instinctive dimension of life and, as mentioned already, a mistakenly 
understood Christian morality. He believed in the triumph of the strength 
of the spirit over weakness. Weak people are afraid to be themselves, 
they hide behind norms, rules, crowds of people similar to themselves. 
When there appears on the horizon a brilliant, brave individual, he is 
immediately subjected to persecution and social ostracism. The fall of a 
man presenting a herd-like, slave morality is deep and final. Nietzsche, 
however, predicts the coming of an overman, more precisely – a 
superman, someone capable of going beyond himself, his weaknesses, 
constituting the personification of the will to power. This is a man 
capable of being authentic, of rejecting all that binds him: rejecting 
values that are out of sync with his hierarchy, decadent culture or 
religion, this is a man prepared for self-realization, even at the cost of 
social disapproval. A man must turn from a camel into a lion, and from a 
lion – into a child, for a child always does what it wants. When the spirit, 
whose transformations are described by Zarathustra, accepts ever 
greater burdens on itself with humility and obedience, it becomes a 
“pack spirit” – a camel. By refusing its own desires, it invites its own 
humiliation, and ultimately comes to perceive the entire monstrousness 
of its hump which it has been carrying and feeding, and which turns out 
to be something external, foreign, arriving in the form of a dragon of 
duties, with which the spirit desires to do battle. It is only at the moment 
of “I want” that the spirit becomes an untamed, wild, free lion who is lord 
of his own desert. Through the sheer force of his rapacity he is able to 
acquire the freedom to a new formation, to win the right to new values. 
Man thus has two paths before him: individualism (the choice of the 
strong) and conformism (undignified). Nietzsche is the eulogist of man’s 
authenticity. 
 But in no way does Christianity order us to make the choice in 
spite of ourselves, falsely, as long as we fulfil the commandments. Rather, 
it says “You can be great, you can be holy.” Not in the least does this 
mean that the key is a consistent and scrupulous adherence to codes. In 
both ideas the essential element is the postulate of self-formation, 
creative work on oneself. It is written in the holy book "Be renewed in 
the spirit of your minds, and put on the new self," (Ephesians 4:23-27). 
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The overman, the superman is such an ambitious task that only a very 
few attempt to meet the challenge. Here we have the fundamental 
difference, for with his trust in man Christ says that each of us can be 
holy if we wish. It is enough to love God and your neighbour, regardless 
of what he does to us. This is, of course, a very difficult task, but it is 
assumed that everyone is capable of succeeding. Nietzsche demonstrates 
a far more sceptical approach and expresses his conviction that very few 
are able to fulfil the postulates of Zarathustra and to understand his 
teachings. The idea of equality is, for Nietzsche, one of the most false 
ideas. 
 
 Regarding love for one’s neighbour – it is worth recalling that in 
Zarathustra’s view, the strong one is he who can refrain from hating 
enemies and from the thirst for revenge. This is the theme of the final 
fragment of "The Tarantulas" [Nietzsche 1954, 110]. Zarathustra himself 
falls prey to a poisonous spider. What is of the greatest importance in 
that moment is to refrain from taking revenge on the tarantulas. 
Zarathustra defends himself from the spirit of revenge. The spirit of 
revenge is, however, unusually strong, which is why Zarathustra calls on 
his friends to restrain him. Thus it becomes visible just how important 
guarding oneself from the spirit of revenge is.  Revenge is nothing more 
than the compulsion to instrumentally take advantage of others. 
Nietzsche is contemptuous of such an attitude, which essentially boils 
down to manipulation in order to exploit and dominate others. 
 However, Nietzsche understands hate itself in a very particular 
manner. Indeed, he does declare that: "Ye shall only have enemies to be 
hated, but not enemies to be despised. Ye must be proud of your 
enemies” [Nietzsche 1954, 48] but what he has in mind is the fact that 
one should find a worthy and equal enemy who should mobilize us to 
become even better. As Nietzsche states, hatred of a mediocrity is 
unbecoming of a philosopher, and what cannot be loved should be 
avoided; this is preferable to wallowing in hatred like the embittered, 
cynical and hypocritical buffoon of "On Passing-By", who is only capable 
of criticism, contempt and exuding poison, and who cannot affirm 
himself nor fill his life with constructive content, with sense. 
Vituperation teaches hate – this is Nietzsche’s view. This parable evokes 
the fragment "Hypocrisy" from the Gospel of St. Luke, which describes 
the case of a man criticizing the speck of sawdust in his brother’s eye 
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while failing to see the beam in his own (Luke 6, 41-45). Zarathustra is 
disgusted by envy, and says that "He whom the flame of jealousy 
encompasseth, turneth at last, like the scorpion, the poisoned sting 
against himself" [Nietzsche 1954, 36]. Christ commands us to love our 
enemies, and Zarathustra appeals for love of the far and the farthest, as 
loving our neighbours is no great thing. 
In one of his letters, Nietzsche remarks that to love oneself well it is 
necessary to practice loving others, as one’s feelings towards oneself and  
towards others are closely correlated. Nietzsche believes in healthy love 
of oneself. In "Thus Spake Zarathustra", he shares the reflection that a 
healthy body may be burdened with the spirit of heaviness, or may be 
freed to soar by its own love. 
 
Self-surpassing  
 The key in understanding the Nietzschean category of the will to 
power is the concept of self-surpassing, that is a mechanism that directs 
and subjugates the drives of instinct; it also refers to maturity and 
spiritual growth. Self-surpassing implies a continuous desire to 
overcome oneself. This is also the primary postulate of Christian 
anthropology. In "Thus Spake Zarathustra" Nietzsche writes: “And life 
itself confided this secret to me: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must 
always overcome itself (…) thus my will wills it.” [Nietzsche 1967, 227]. 
The will to power means something along the lines of the will to 
subjectivity, to become an autonomous individual capable of creating 
and materializing values. 
In Nietzsche’s opinion, it is people themselves who create morality and 
law, they do not receive them from anyone. Man gives value to objects. It 
is only when creating value that man creates a world that makes sense. 
This is why he bears a tremendous responsibility: he encounters 
material which he then turns into things, and gives them meaning. What 
those things will be depends solely on him. Man is the creator. Without 
him, "the nut of existence would be hollow" [Nietzsche 1954, 61]. In the 
Gospel, man is also tasked with taming the earth and giving it sense, an 
example of which is the naming of animals in the Book of Genesis. 
Without man, the world would have no sense. For Nietzsche, creativity is 
never a painless activity: "Always doth he destroy who hath to be a 
creator" [Nietzsche 1954, 61]. Zarathustra teaches that while values are 
relative, in the sense that different people and different nations have 
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different values, they are absolute in the sense that everyone must select 
just one system and reject all others. This is why creating new values is 
always the destruction of old ones. In this sense, there is no innocent 
creativity.  
 Nietzsche writes about creating oneself that between the old, 
existing "I" of man and that which is to be created there is a strong 
tension. The creating man is contemptuous of that which drags him 
down. He defeats the spirit of heaviness, that is, it conquers what 
inclines him to sloth and what evokes disdain. This undoubtedly refers to 
a struggle for oneself. In Christianity, this battle has an equally dramatic 
nature, but there is something to draw on. 
 
 Zarathustra is returning to health, which means that he is 
returning to himself, returning home, assuming his destiny, he is en route 
to himself. This is not easy. He speaks on behalf of life and is the teacher 
of eternal return and the overman. And the overman himself – who is 
that? For sure, Nietzsche is not thinking of someone who possesses 
another constitution, understood as other conditions of life on earth, 
particular predispositions. Going beyond means seeking one’s absent 
essence, finding it and fortifying oneself in it. Going beyond the present 
man is a bridge, a transition. It is not about striking out or deprecating 
the existing self. Zarathustra is a teacher, perhaps the most perfect 
among men, but he himself is not the over-man, the super-man. 
Nietzsche, in turn, is the one who analyses the essence of Zarathustra. 
 For Nietzsche, freedom has a positive character, it is not only 
freedom from, but primarily freedom to. As we can conclude from the 
parable "The Tree on the Hill", freedom is not something given, but it 
must be won, taken away from the prison of necessity and obligation 
that is the framework of obliging morality. Freedom is the will to power, 
that is, the will to create. In order for a man to self-surpass, he must free 
himself from the values forced on him by society. A free man is one who 
issues orders to himself, and who surpasses himself. The weak, who are 
not capable of doing that, need a morality imposed on them from above. 
The free man, however, can create it himself. Freedom can thus be 
achieved only by the strong. Freedom is associated with responsibility of 
the creator for what he creates. Nietzsche names the free man a warrior. 
In "Twilight of the Idols", he writes:  
“And war educates for freedom. For what is freedom? That one has 
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the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains 
the distance which separates us. That one becomes more 
indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even to life itself. 
That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one's cause, not 
excluding oneself. Freedom means that the manly instincts which 
delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, for 
example, over those of ‘pleasure’. The human being who has 
become free — and how much more the spirit who has become 
free — spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by 
shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other 
democrats. The free man is a warrior. How is freedom measured in 
individuals and peoples? According to the resistance which must be 
overcome, according to the exertion required, to remain on top" 
[Nietzsche 1967, 541-542]. 
 However, Nietzsche criticizes tendencies to manipulate the 
external environment in order to exploit it. Personal power directed 
towards the task of overcoming oneself is something entirely different. 
Not in the least does he mean the self-surpassing experienced by 
religious ascetics, in whose case it is difficult to speak of self-affirmation, 
but rather merely of repressiveness directed towards oneself. The ideas 
is to creatively assimilate impulses for them to undergo a creative 
transformation and be uplifted. Nietzsche’s thought should not be 
identified with a primitive naturalism. The ascetic not only extinguishes 
his impulses, but he also destroys creative energy itself. Yet it is impulses 
that are to awaken us, to constitute the stuff of a creative life. In 
Nietzsche’s opinion, the saint turns upon himself that severity that is so 
closely allied to the instinct of domination at any price and which inspire 
even in the most solitary individual the sense of power.8 Power (Macht) 
is something positive, it may even be said to be a type of sublimation, 
while the ascetic attitude expresses nothing but a conquering of oneself, 
which is effected through violence (Gewalt).9 The will to power is never 
entirely satisfied. Nietzsche feels that Christianity, which presents itself as 
a personal blueprint of the ascetic saint, never experiences the authentic 
will to power in the slightest. But Nietzsche’s image of Christianity is not 
entirely accurate, as Christian philosophy promotes an active attitude, 
                                                 
8 See [Nietzsche 2004, 78, paragraph 142]. In his earlier letters Nietzsche paints 
a picture of people as motivated by instinctual drives. However, he does not perceive 
overcoming as the elimination of individual drives, but rather holds them to be their 
creative and conscious sublimation.  
9 See more: [Golomb 2002, 19-46]. 
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and the sacrifices that complement it have an entirely different aim and 
context. In Christianity, the point is not mortification, but rather a 
creative joy and appreciation for the riches given to us by God. For 
Nietzsche, the object of that love and infatuation is different, it is life 
itself, but the fundamental disposition is similar. Nietzsche puts life in 
God’s place, but also treats it as a gift, which is attested to by the words of 
Zarathustra: “Thus wisheth the type of noble souls: they desire to have 
nothing gratuitously, least of all, life. He who is of the populace wisheth 
to live gratuitously; we others, however, to whom life hath given itself—
we are ever considering what we can best give in return!” [Nietzsche 
1954, 222]. There is a similarity between the Christian concept of love 
and the bestowing virtue of Nietzsche. 
 A symptom of the culture of contemporary man is that he is lazy, 
that he wants to do little. Let us recall the rage of Zarathustra: "Ye world-
weary ones, however! Ye earth-idlers! You, shall one beat with stripes! 
With stripes shall one again make you sprightly limbs” [Nietzsche 1954, 
231]. Meanwhile, modern man would prefer that a similar tepidity, sloth, 
and nihilism become something commonplace. He is afraid of the sort of 
attitude that is an authentic, responsible care for life and values that 
remain consistently strong. The ardour of others evokes a feeling of 
shame in him towards his passive attitude. Nietzsche, it is true, was not 
addressing values, but rather overcoming the spirit of heaviness, of 
nihilism, the attitude of the abnegator that destroys us and is expressed 
in the thought “everything is senseless, I desire to do nothing, I don’t 
mind” when we are attacked by the monster of despondency. Christianity 
places a similar task before man, of overcoming his own laziness and 




 Nietzsche’s interpretation of Christianity is inadequate in many 
places, and also inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity. Many 
examples may be cited, such as Nietzsche’s making reference out of 
context to the Gospel of St. Luke, “Woe unto those who laugh here” 
[Nietzsche 1967, 405] as evidence that Christianity is a dreary, majestic 
religion, a religion of whining and gnashing of teeth, of unreflective 
devotion. Meanwhile, the God of Zarathustra would have to be able to 
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dance. In Nietzsche’s opinion, people who are ruthless, with heavy hearts 
and legs, are not capable of dancing. Dance is expression, an expression 
of oneself; alongside dance, Zarathustra praises laughter which is the 
laughter of joy. And while Christianity is essentially a religion in which 
the crucified and crucifixion constitute the central figure, we are not 
allowed to forget that of greatest importance in this religion is what 
happened next, the surpassing of death, the emergence from the 
twilight, the triumph of hope and the joyful Hallelujah. 
 In order to demonstrate that Christianity is not only a religion 
that affirms suffering, but is primarily a religion of joy, I shall quote a 
portion of Psalm 98:  
"Shout for joy to the LORD, all the earth, 
burst into jubilant song with music; 
make music to the LORD with the harp, 
with the harp and the sound of singing, 
with trumpets and the blast of the ram’s horn— 
shout for joy before the LORD, the King.”10 
 Nietzsche, however, levels more chargers. For the German 
philosopher, Christianity was a ban on thinking and the freedom of 
choice. The Nietzschean free spirit runs up against various interdictions, 
but none of them are capable of provoking such trepidation in him that 
he would waver or withdraw. As he says himself,  “and if there is 
anything in me that is virtue, it is that I had no fear of any forbiddance" 
[Nietzsche 1967, 385-386]. Christianity is perceived through the lens of 
prohibitions and orders. 
 
In Karol Wojtyła’s  “Love and responsibility", the fundamental 
prohibition of Christianity is presented, namely that a human may not be 
exploited, may not be treated like an object to be used. The most 
significant value is personal dignity. Is this the prohibition that Nietzsche 
fought? He battled with the form itself, id est the commandment, the 
external norm, but if he were to read more into the content of the 
prohibition, he would surely agree with it.  
 Truth in the epistemic sense is the analysis of a judgement. 
However, as emphasized by Tadeusz Styczeń, it is always someone who 
declares a truth. Personalist ethics, expressed inter alia in K. Wojtyła’s 
"Person and Action", is dignitative; it assumes that personal dignity is 
                                                 
10 Psalm 98, Praise to the Lord, Saviour of the earth 
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the right of every individual and constitutes a criterion for assessing the 
moral value of an act, and it is also veritative. This last term indicates 
that it is an ethics of the normative strength of truth. The implication is 
that the individual who denies a truth that he himself previously declared 
and which was not forced on him commits a form of moral suicide. 
Assertion leads to acceptance. We must remain true to the truth, for 
otherwise we destroy our identity when we act contrary to that which 
we identify as important. This is the essence of evil.  
 In Nietzsche’s view, the good do harm through their idiocy. Evil is 
spawned by their conceit and self-esteem. The good are those who think 
of themselves in that way, who are uncritical of themselves, veritable 
biblical Pharisees.11 Yet with a sliver of sensitivity and reflexiveness, 
there is no way to have a clean conscience, a type of hypnosis. The 
criminals, in Zarathustra’s view, are those who sleep soundly. He feels 
that the harm done by the good is the most injurious harm. 
 
 As Tadeusz Styczeń says, one of the fundamental norms of 
Christianity can be encapsulated in the sentence "The truth should be 
affirmed for its own sake", and "What I myself have declared, I may not 
deny."12 A declaration of truth is morally binding upon the one who 
declared it. A truth therefore is not only informational, but also 
normative. Wojtyła emphasizes the experience of the normative strength 
of truth. There may be no talk of an individual’s good intentions in a case 
when he possesses knowledge and fails to use it to prevent evil. Action is 
a condition of morality. Personalist ethics appears as normative 
anthropology. However, it can be applied as a universal ethics, for its 
norms are general. I may not deny a truth I myself have declared, but if I 
feel that I have erred, I may of course withdraw. For Heidegger, an 
untruth was treated like going astray. A personalist, however, would tell 
us “if I don’t go astray, I acknowledge truth and my task is to remain 
faithful to it. But how can I be sure that I really did err in the past, that 
this new ascertainment is correct, that it is not because I want to 
withdraw from an uncomfortable truth but truth nonetheless?” In this 
approach, man and his conscience should not be the final instance. 
Christian ethics proposes to go beyond subjectivity, which is why a 
                                                 
11 Cf. [Nietzsche 1967, 324]. 
12 Cf. [Styczeń 1993, 87-89]. 
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foundation is necessary. Here we reach the primary difference between 
Nietzsche and Christianity, as for Nietzsche, man should not seek such 
clues and solutions outside himself. Nietzsche goes even further, posing 
curious and even more fundamental question on the value of truth, or 
rather – of justification for the will to truth. He provocatively asks us 
why we desire the truth, perhaps it is an untruth we truly desire; he also 
rejects the idea of truth’s inherent value. Will to truth itself, for him, is the 
will to power in the sense that it is life, power, and not appropriateness 
or conformance with the thing that is the only value in differentiating 
the truth from false. Value for life, not whether something is or is not in 
agreement with the facts, turns out to be decisive.13  Nietzsche proposes 
a reconstruction of the European mythical constellation in order to expel 
the concept of truth, and an external, timeless Absolute which are tightly 
linked with the Christian attitude towards the world based on the 
principle of empathy.14 
 Meanwhile, there is no way to avoid passing judgement, this is an 
immanent human trait. It may be demonstrated that every judgement 
contains a semantic, logical, epistemic or informational element, but 
potentially a normative one as well. This may be demonstrated using 
even a trivial example. The sun rose today at 5:45. Let us assume that 
there are those who will tempt us by saying "I will give you a thousand 
dollars if you declare with conviction that this happened at 11:00." The 
truth, however, remains the truth; for the truth itself, nothing is changed 
by beginning to deny it. However, this violence turns against the 
individual who declares nonsense for money. Christianity says nothing 
more than faithfulness to the truth may constitute a norm.  
 In summary – we may speak sensibly about the truth in ethics. 
Ethical utterances may be viewed in terms of truth and false, they are 
sentences in a logical sense. But by no means are these truths imposed. 
The autonomy of the individual is of capital significance. Of the 
individual who ascertains the truth, which binds him until the moment 
when he recognizes that he has erred. The individual must discover this 
truth for himself, nobody will free him from this obligation, we may not 
                                                 
13 See: [Allen 1995]. 
14 Often a link is assumed and demonstrated between Christian empathy and 
fundamental metaphysical figures, such as the absolute or the immortal soul. One 
example is the interpretation offered by Piotr Graczyk in the article: Nietzsche a 
chrześcijaństwo, (en. Nietzsche and Christianity) [Graczyk 2002, 29-44]. 
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speak here of any dictate. Even if inspiration comes from the outside, this 
does not change the fact that I always declare the truth myself and accept 
it freely; it is not imposed on me in any way. Nietzsche was mistaken in 
linking Christianity with slavery. 
 
Things have value, people possess dignity. We are capable of being 
moral creatures, which distinguishes us from animals. In personalist 
phenomenology, to affirm someone means first and foremost to see the 
person in him. Affirmation is also care to satisfy the needs of another 
person (this is, of course, an entirely different understanding of 
affirmation than that of Nietzsche). With Nietzsche, affirmation has a 
different character due to the fact that it is affirmation solely of this life 
and this world. Another fundamental difference is that affirmation in 
Christianity results in duty. This does not, however, mean the unreflective 
acceptance of external rules, but rather that if I concur with something 
and feel it is important for me, this must have its consequences. 
Nietzsche demands of the higher man that he be capable of engaging in 
battle with the dragon of duty that arrives from the outside. Meanwhile, 
for a Christian, what is binding is not what someone imposes on him, 
but rather that which he accepts of his own will. 
 
Inspirations and references 
 In the creative output of the German philosopher we find very 
many references to Christianity, some more, and some less literal. This is 
particularly visible in "Thus Spake Zarathustra". Let us cite some 
examples. Zarathustra feels that man swims about in puddles, inlets and 
shallows, so he should be dispatched out to the full sea. This gives us 
pause to think if we are not, by chance, living all the time in some 
monstrous restriction of our own selves. The sea is of course but a 
metaphor, it signifies a broadening of horizons, liberation, adventure, the 
sea is also time travel, it gives us a taste of eternity.  As we know, Jesus 
was also supposed to set out on a boat with his disciples, an important 
motif in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
 Another example. In the parable "The Convalescent", an 
exhausted Zarathustra needs seven days to recover; Job also requires 
seven days and nights after his extreme experience before he can open 
his mouth. In the same vein, the supper to which Zarathustra invites his 
comrades is a reference to the last supper of Christ. Yet Zarathustra is 
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not the messiah who has come to put things right, as he himself 
renounces, responding to similar suggestions "Three times Nay!" 
[Nietzsche 1954, 323]. All he does is to share his wisdom and 
experience, as when he says "If ye would go up high, then use your own 
legs! Do not get yourselves carried aloft; do not seat yourselves on other 
people’s backs and heads!" [Nietzsche 1954, 325]. This is exactly what 
the dwarf did in jumping on Zarathustra’s shoulders. Nietzsche criticizes 
dependence, particularly of thought. He feels that if we are to acquire 
proficiency in conquering summits, acquiring courage, wisdom and 
strength, then only by doing it ourselves, from beginning to end, rather 
than to be carted to the top without our feet taking a single step along 
the way. And if man is unsuccessful? All the more, then: get to work, 
begin anew, do not despair, but rather let us begin by learning to laugh at 
ourselves.  
 
 Finally – in the last parable, “The Sign", we find many analogies to 
Christianity. What is interesting, in Nachlass the title of this parable is 
given as "Symbol". It is known that the symbol of Mark the Evangelist is 
a lion. The appearance of a lion may lead to associations with the 
appearance of the Messiah, with resurrection itself. It was believed in 
ancient times that lion cubs are stillborn, then animated with the roar of 
a lion. It is precisely the roar of a lion that is heard after Zarathustra 
plunges his arm into the shaggy hair of the predator. In the Bible, we find 
a bucolic image of a child who, upon arrival of the Messiah, fearlessly 
thrusts his hand into a viper’s den. The Messiah restores natural 
harmony and peace to people. In the last parable there is also an allusion, 
as prior to exiting the cave Zarathustra girded his loins; this is a biblical 
expression, a symbol that someone has finally set out on his way.  
 After the lion’s roar, Zarathustra understands his gravest sin, 
empathy with the higher man. Previously he was tempted towards 
empathy. Zarathustra understands empathy as a state of dependence on 
his disciples, and vice versa – the disciples themselves on Zarathustra. In 
this fragment we may find many analogies with the New Testament. 
When Jesus’ disciples fell asleep following the last supper, he alone kept 
watch while they slept; the same can be seen here, as only Zarathustra is 
conscious. Christ was crucified, to be resurrected. And Zarathustra? He 
tells his disciples that when all of them have denied him, that is when he 
will return. Empathy makes independence, determination and 
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renouncement impossible, which is why it must be eliminated. The 
Saviour of the Gospels is always available to his disciples, he promises 
resurrection and his continual presence. Zarathustra does the opposite – 
he calls a moment of doubt concerning the abandonment of his disciples 
his last sin. The lion’s descendants were to experience an awakening, a 
new birth upon his roar; but after that roar the higher men flee, they run 
away from Zarathustra, and regain their independence. 
 I could cite a whole range of other references, even very direct 
ones, to Christianity placed by Nietzsche in "Thus Spake Zarathustra".15 
                                                 
15 One of the best examples is the parable "The Awakening" (ger. “Erwachen”). 
Interestingly, in Nietzsche’s notes published as Nachlass. Writings from 1884-1885, the 
title "Resurrected" appears in relation to the tale. The action takes place after the 
psalms, in the evening, so it seems reasonable to ask why the title is "The Awakening"? 
This title is metaphorical, referring to a spiritual awakening; indeed, one can awaken 
from various states like lethargy, torpor, stupor. This tale is about a return to health, that 
is, an awakening from illness, coming to, rejuvenation, a situation in which someone 
suddenly rises, not necessarily from sleep. The protagonists of the parable awaken and 
begin to return health in the evening. When the psalms finished, a tumult arose in the 
cave; Zarathustra chose to leave, and returned later to speak to the animals. He remarks 
that the people in the cave are beginning to laugh, learning to laugh at themselves, 
which allows them to fight off the spirit of heaviness. This laughter precipitates their 
return to health. It is known that the spirit of heaviness constitutes a serious threat. 
The spirit of heaviness is Zarathustra’s main concern. This threat hangs over man at all 
times. Man stands before the task of attempting to free himself from the spirit of 
heaviness. The spirit of heaviness is a name for something that overwhelms 
Europeans. Meanwhile, the point is to become playful, free, unfettered, to belong to 
oneself. To free the spirit from all of its prisons, from gloom, and to free oneself from 
unconsciousness. The ass’s feast is killing with laughter, irony. Zarathustra’s comrades 
learn to laugh at themselves. Zarathustra heals them with fortifying words, which leads 
to transformation of the various planes of their existence, desires and hopes. 
Particularly deserving of attention is the guests’ prayer to the ass. While the ass is the 
tenth guest, he rather constitutes an object of adoration. The entire final fragment of 
the parable is full of biblical references, and even nearly-literal citations from the 
Gospel, such as the reference to the Revelation of St. John 7:12 "Praise and glory and 
wisdom and thanks and honor and power and strength be to our God for ever and 
ever." Other clear borrowings come in the phrases "bears our load", "the heart is 
patient", and the fragment from the Book of Wisdom "he who loves his son will not 
spare the rod", which Nietzsche changes to “he who loves his Lord will not spare the 
rod". What, however, is the sense in this parable full of allusions, sometimes with 
intentions reversed towards the Old and New Testament? This combination of citations 
gives an entirely new undertone. The symbolism of the ass himself is also of interest. 
One lead may be found in the interpretation by Gilles Deleuze, who draws attention to 
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They demonstrate that he was deeply inspired by Christianity, even 
though he usually distanced himself from it. These were not just 
meaningless references or provocations, a flourish of erudition or 
stylistic turns of phrase. If Plato’s thought is thought from inside a 
metaphor, I thus dare to risk the thesis that the sensitivity and the 
majesty of Nietzsche, even if on many occasions he thinks in opposition 
to Christianity, fundamentally comes from the interior, the very depths of 
Christianity; but not the institutional Christianity, expressed in dogmas 
or external dressing, but rather from the message of man’s summons to 
love, creativity and affirmation. 
 
                                                                                                                            
the fact that the ass, like the camel, is a pack animal intended to bear as many loads as 
possible. In antiquity, the ass was first perceived as holy, but then took on a humorous 
significance and became an object of ridicule. Christ was presented with the ears of an 
ass. The image of the ass contains an ambivalence: valued for its utility and even 
irreplaceable labour, the ass was also held in disdain. In ancient Greece and for the 
Phoenicians, it had quite positive connotations. Dionysus rode an ass, judges of high 
social status rode asses, Jesus’s ceremonial entrance on an ass into Jerusalem was a 
harbinger of his triumph. For a long time the Romans sacrificed asses to the god of 
fertility, but he was suddenly associated with the spreading and strengthening 
Christianity. From that moment on, Jews and the first Christians were scornfully 
referred to as worshippers of the ass. Deleuze had similar intuitions, that the traits of 
the ass were precisely the traits of Jesus. 
Anna Szklarska 
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NIETZSCHE AND CHRISTIANITY 
 
The article presents connections between philosophy of Nietzsche and 
the Christian tradition. Author's considerations are not restricted to how 
Nietzsche assessed Christianity and what he thought of it, but rather: did 
he reason aptly, did he grasp it correctly. 
It is a fact that Nietzsche fights with Christianity, which does not prevent 
him from internalizing some Christian themes in spite of having a very 
superficial and incomplete picture of it. There are unquestionable 
differences in both doctrines such as the relationship to the issues of 
truth, compassion, transcendence, mercy and eternity. Nevertheless they 
share a large number of common elements: praise for authenticity, 
creativity and freedom, the ethics of dignity, the postulate of self-
formation, appreciation of suffering, rejection of revenge and everything 
that is small and false, and finally, discipline of the will craving repetition 
as a confirmation of self, faithfulness to self. 
 
KEYWORDS: Nietzsche, Christianity, Zarathustra,  affirmation,  self-
surpassing 
 
 
